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Across the Great Divide:
Ankersmit's Aesthetic Gap and
Representative Democracy
Christopher Bourne
This thesis is an exploration of an aesthetic approach to political theory. In particular, I
examine the concept of representative democracy in terms of philosophical aesthetics.
Drawing inspiration from RR. Ankersmit's Aesthetic Politics: Political Philosophy
Beyond Fact and Value, I argue that there is a necessary 'distance' between citizens and
their government, that, if ignored, can have totalitarian consequences. Understanding this
distance, also known as the 'aesthetic gap,' requires an exploration of the notion of
perspective. Ultimately, once both citizens and government begin to comprehend their
particular perspectives, the question of what it means to be represented in a democratic
regime becomes comprehensible. This awareness leads to interesting implications for the
role of the political representative, and about the relationship between citizens and their
governors.
iv
This thesis is dedicated to Julie Rose Biais
for her ineffable love and support;
and to Dr. Ed King
for his sense of perspective.
Table of Contents
Chapter 1: Introduction 2
The Aesthetic Framework 3
Political and Aesthetic Representation 8
Ankersmit's Aesthetic Political Representation 1 1
Chapter 2: Aesthetic Representation 1 3
The Paradox of Representation 1 6
Chapter 3: Debating Representation 21
Mimetic Representation 24
Aesthetic Trusteeship 32
Chapter 4: Distance, Indifference, and the Aesthetic Gap 36
Totalitarianism 40
Ethics and Morality 43
Chapter 5: An Aesthetic Compromise 49
The Nature of Compromise 52
Political Parties 54
Chapter 6: Conclusion 58
Coda 61
Works Cited 64
Ever since Burkhardt saw that the meaning of Machiavelli's method was to rum the state
into a work of art by the rational manipulation of power, it has been an open possibility to
apply the method of art analysis to the critical evaluation of society ... The Western
world, dedicated since the sixteenth century to the increase and consolidation of the
power of the state, has developed an artistic unity of effect which makes artistic criticism
ofthat effect quite feasible.
~H. Marshall McLuhan, The Mechanical Bride
'Completely true to nature!'—what a lie:
How could nature ever be constrained into a picture?
The smallest bit of nature is infinite!
And so he paints what he likes about it.
And what does he like? He likes what he can paint!
-Friedrich Nietzsche, The Gay Science
2Chapter 1: Introduction
A relationship between aesthetics and politics has been articulated since the earliest
written works of philosophy. Plato's condemnation of the artists in the Republic is among
the more famous examples. A lesser known, but perhaps more interesting example is
Hobbes' ironic denunciation of the role ofmetaphor and other literary and rhetorical
tropes for understanding politics in Leviathan (Hobbes 37). There is a nascent but
growing literature that seeks to define and invigorate an aesthetic approach to
understanding political phenomena. Nonetheless, the relationship between aesthetics, an
ambiguous term connoting variously art and sensory experience, and politics, a term of
no less varied employment, while interesting, is today rarely seen as intrinsic or
necessary. I will argue, however, that an aesthetic approach to understanding political
phenomena allows for the resolution of previously intractable dilemmas that have
developed due to an over-reliance on fact and value distinctions in contemporary political
thought.
The problem of representation in democracies will be explored using an aesthetic
approach in an attempt to demonstrate this thesis. I will argue that, more than simply
providing an interesting problem on which to employ aesthetic political theory,
representation is particularly appropriate to illustrate aesthetic political theory, because
the concept of representation is essential to both politics and aesthetics. This kinship is
more than semantic. Understanding representation aesthetically will lend intelligibility to
political representation. Understanding political representation will help illustrate the
aesthetic approach to politics. The two forms of representation are isomorphic.
Representation provides a clear example of how an aesthetic trope can be employed to
enhance understanding politics.
Therefore the ultimate goal of this project is to explore the usefulness of an
aesthetic approach to political theory. Prior to attempting this, however, certain
clarifications need to be made. 'Aesthetics' in particular is a broad and multifaceted term,
and care must be taken to examine and articulate those elements of aesthetic theory that
are useful for making political phenomena intelligible.
The Aesthetic Framework
From Aristotle's Poetics to the political theories of the Frankfurt school, aesthetics is
demonstrably an irresistible topic to many philosophers. A thorough survey of the subject
would require more space than would be appropriate here, as evidenced by the length of
comprehensive studies of the concept (Gilbert and Kuhn 1954). It is safest, therefore, to
begin with a basic definition and the essential connotations of the term. I am more than
willing to concede that further research into the genealogy of aesthetics would enrich this
premise. Nonetheless, one has to start somewhere. I will take as fundamental two aspects
of aesthetics: sense perception and appreciation of the beautiful, in particular, art. Of
these two, the connection between the first and politics is perhaps clearer. Imagining an
understanding of politics based on sense perception, especially as opposed to rational,
metaphysical inquiry, is not a particularly difficult leap, one that has nonetheless been
4mostly ignored within the study of contemporary political theory, despite the legacy of
skeptical philosophers such as Hume. An art of politics or simply a connection between
the two, however, may require firmer ground. What I will attempt to show is that there is
coherence, ifnot complete unity, between these two elements of aesthetics, art, or
appreciation of the beautiful, and sense perception, and that this more comprehensive
view of aesthetics is useful for understanding politics.
To reiterate, the notion of aesthetics has two distinct but interdependent
connotations that will be relevant for the development of my thesis: art and sensory
experience. An aesthetic approach to political theory is grounded in the primacy of
human sensory experience, and simultaneously recognizes that the tools of artistic
analysis can provide fruitful insights into political phenomena.
Like any tool, there are situations for which the aesthetic approach will be a
suitable heuristic, and there will be times that it is inappropriate. To be clear, what I seek
to articulate is ultimately an aesthetic political framework. Ostrom offers a clear
definition ofwhat this would constitute within the context ofpolitical science:
Frameworks organize diagnostic and prescriptive enquiry ... Frameworks
provide a metatheoretical language that can be used to compare theories.
They attempt to identify the universal elements that any theory relevant to
the same kind of phenomena would need to include ... the elements
contained in a framework help analysts generate the questions that need to
be addressed when they first conduct an analysis (Ostrom 2007, 25).
A comprehensive framework would therefore lend coherence to the debates surrounding
the use of aesthetics in political investigations, and would be an invaluable asset for
aesthetic political theory, in that it would help define the scope of aesthetic enquiry, rather
5than simply proposing relationships between concepts. I do not expect to fully realize this
goal within the scope of this project. Nonetheless, I hope to begin to contribute to a
framework of aesthetic political thought, one which could be expanded through further
research and analysis. This exercise, however, is not purely methodological. By carefully
articulating my framework, I hope to build a solid foundation on which to reincorporate
tools ofphilosophical aesthetics into political theory.
Prior to exploring the meaning of aesthetics in terms ofpolitical philosophy, one
should bear in mind Hutter's warning to Von Vacano:
'Aesthetics' is one of the most misused terms in the confused discourses
of both popular and academic culture. It purveys an almost systematic
ambiguity that seems to define the confusion of modern understandings
concerning art, morality, politics, ethics, as well as good, bad, and evil
(Hutter2007, 1).
Clearly, 'aesthetics' is a term with a scope so broad that it is as, if not more, likely to
obscure than to clarify. I will argue, as Hutter suggests, that, for the sake of political
philosophy, the most useful conception of aesthetics entails a return to the "Greek term
aisthesis that merely designates the human capacity for sense experience" (Hutter 2),
without, however, neglecting the useful insights that can be drawn from artistic
connotations of the term. Acceptance of the primacy of sense experience roots any
understanding of the world in the recognition of the partiality of human life, that every
person possesses their own point ofview due to their unique set of experiences (Hutter 2,
Von Vacano 188). The primacy of individual human perspective is therefore centrally
important to aesthetic political philosophy.
6The centrality of the individual is not a revolutionary idea in the realm of political
theory. Each of the three mainstream contemporary traditions of political theory:
liberalism, republicanism, and communitarianism, all locate the human individual as the
locus from which the political order emanates. Liberalism is premised on the individual's
conception of a universally just social order. Republicanism entails identification with the
public interest on the part of the individual. Communitarianism focuses on the realization
of the self within the community (Ankersmit 1996, 7). Ultimately, what separates these
from the aesthetic tradition is the latter' s recognition, not of the centrality of the
individual's perspective, but of the necessary, sensory limitations on the individual's
perspective. Aesthetic political theory is therefore perfectly suited to incorporate the
concept ofhuman limitation into the study of politics.
Humans are finite beings, with a limited range of potential experiences. This
finitude emerges from the material nature of the physical world. A priori truths are, if not
impossible, irrelevant for the sake of human functioning (Hutter 2). From this emerges a
sense ofpartiality, of the separateness of one individual from the rest. This sense of
separateness could be characterized as a kind of disorder that emerges from "unconscious
and mutually contradictory passions" (Hutter 3). I can find no better description of the
origin ofhuman finitude and partiality than this. Nietzsche and Machiavelli are two
thinkers who, each in their own way, consider this human limitation to be of central
political importance (Von Vacano 2, Hutter 2). While they share a similar concern, the
way in which each would propose to address this concern are profoundly different.
7Simply described, Machiavelli's solution is outer and Nietzsche's inner. For Machiavelli,
society, and for Nietzsche the individual soul, are the units of analysis.
In fact, a preliminary definition of aesthetic political theory can readily be drawn
from the dedicatory letter that opens Machiavelli's The Prince, one that entails three
essential characteristics. The first is the essential brokenness of the political world; a
world divided into that of the prince and that of the people. Politics belongs to the prince,
ethics to the people and the two perspectives rarely meet to the advantage of either party.
The second characteristic follows on from that in that the brokenness emerges from the
different perspectives of the actors, the different points of view of the princes on the
mountain and the people on the plain. The final characteristic is that this difference in
perspective allows for the kind of distance necessary for observation and understanding
(Ankersmit 1996, 18, Von Vacano, 139).
The separateness of prince and people exemplifies the crucial concept of the
'aesthetic gap', the necessary separateness between representative and represented
(Ankersmit 1996, 1 19). As Ankersmit illustrates:
The prince is always a representation in the minds of the people ...
whereas the people can only present themselves to the prince's mind as a
representation—and there is no medium, neutral, or common ground
where these two representatives meet or could be matched . . . alienation is
where all politics begin (Ankersmit 1996, 120).
Political problems then emerge from a bifurcated political reality where there is an
absence of common ground between people and their governors. The aesthetic gap is thus
rooted in the essential brokenness of politics and the necessary separation between
citizens and government.
8This lack of continuity between citizens and government is a central concern of an
aesthetic approach to politics, one especially significant for the study of representative
democracy. Part of my goal for this work is to see how an elaboration of the aesthetic gap
can enrich a discussion of the nature of political representation within a democracy.
An aesthetic approach to politics, one rooted in brokenness, can be seen as
counterintuitive. "We are naturally inclined to value concord, union, and consensus in
politics: for does not all politics aim at the reconciliation of conflict and at the
replacement of disorder and disunion with order and union?" (Ankersmit 2002, 189).
However, one must question whether or not union and consensus are realistic political
goals if the origin of political life is disorder. This disorder, this gap between people and
their governors means that representation will always be an essential part ofpolitical life.
For what is political representation but an attempt to bridge this gap? In any form of
government beyond the crudest despotism, there is a relationship between people and
their government. The task of representation, and of the political representative in
representative democracy, is to understand what that relationship is.
Political and Aesthetic Representation
Prior to entering into a discussion of the aesthetic nature ofpolitical representation, it is
necessary to justify the compatibility of the terms. For who is to say that representation in
the political sense and representation in the aesthetic or artistic sense are anything more
than homonyms? While 1 am initially inclined to simply try to apply the tools of artistic
9aesthetic representation to political representation and see where it leads, I feel it safer to
justify the use of these tools for this particular exercise. What similarities exist between
politics and aesthetics that might justify the use of aesthetic tools for political
understanding?
Representation is a point of commonality for politics and aesthetics, and thus a
reasonable point of departure for this project. Representation is both political: "all politics
presupposes the self-awareness of the political collectivity that is paradigmatically
exemplified by (political) representation" (Ankersmit 1996, 23), and aesthetic: "the three
traditional categories of aesthetic theory, representation, expression/emotion and form,
can be translated into political language" (Von Vacano 145) (Emphasis mine).
Ultimately, an aesthetic approach can help make representative politics intelligible
to both theorists and citizens. Theorists benefit from new tools with which to understand
political questions, those of art and literary criticism. Citizens have an opportunity to
educate their sensibilities to meet the challenges of contemporary politics, and engage in
constructive dialogue with their representatives. This can only happen if citizens begin to
clarify the nature of their relationship with their representatives. An articulation of an
aesthetic approach to politics encompasses the goal of lending coherence to the debates
surrounding the use of aesthetics in political investigations. By carefully articulating the
aesthetic framework, a solid foundation can be built on which to incorporate tools of
aesthetic analysis into political theory.
Pitkin's study of the concept of representation still ranks among the most
comprehensive, as a guide to the concept, it is essential. While tightly argued, Pitkin's
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work rarely engages the concept of representation in a critical manner, being content with
an exegesis of different conceptions of representation (Fain 1 10), Furthermore, Pitkin
comments that, while a basic definition of political representation is elusive (Pitkin 5-6),
artistic conceptions of representation can lend clarity (Pitkin 7).
What I hope to add to Pitkin's study is the aesthetic perspective. Pitkin presents
two opposing understandings of representation, both of which are necessary to
understand the concept as a whole. These understandings of representation can each be
characterized by the relationship between representative and represented. Is the
representative free to act as a trustee, to do what he or she feels is best for the community,
or does the representative act as a delegate of the community, one who would do what the
members ofthat community would do, if they could be there? This dichotomy, she argues
(Pitkin 148) is the most fundamental in the study of political representation. Recall
Burke's famous letter to the electors of Bristol, in which he offers a clear defense of the
trusteeship model of representation (Pitkin 169-170). On the other hand, proponents of
direct democracy clarify the delegate model. This debate, Pitkin argues, is intractable.
Both sides make compelling arguments about the nature of representation. Political
representatives, however, continue their work, blissfully unaware of the theoretical
contradictions that define what they do. An aesthetic approach will help illuminate that
practice of political representation.
pAnkersmit's Aesthetic Political Representation
My main source for understanding this approach to political questions is drawn from the
work of F.R. Ankersmit. Unfortunately, scholarship on Ankersmit's work on aesthetic
political theory and political representation is underdeveloped. This is not entirely
surprising. Most of Ankersmit's work is as a philosopher of history. When his insights
from the study of history were transferred to the field of political theory, they proved
antithetical to prevailing traditions. His form of political theory had little point of contact
with rival frameworks. A lack of engagement by the scholarly community of political
theorists is therefore not surprising. This is not to say that his work is not explored within
the context of the study of history. Two ofhis more recent books focusing on politics,
however, (1996, 2002) have largely been ignored.
Perhaps due to the interdisciplinary nature of his work, his theories have yet to
find purchase within the community of political theorists. Ankersmit's work on the
subject began with an investigation of historical representation, which he enriched
through notions from aesthetics. This, in turn led him to an investigation of political
representation. I wish to explore Ankersmit's notion ofpolitical representation and
employ it to help explicate the debate that Pitkin identifies as lying unresolved between
delegatory and trusteeship representation.
Von Vacano's understanding of aesthetic political, theory is very similar to that of
Ankersmit, the essence of the aesthetic perspective is rooted in "the way politics is, rather
than how it ought to be" (Von Vacano 1-2). His understanding emerges, not from a study
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of history, as does Ankersmit's, but rather from an attempt to demonstrate the basic
compatibility of the ideas ofMachiavelli and Nietzsche (Von Vacano 1). And while his
explicit goals primarily relate to exploring these two thinkers, he reserves a place in his
project for an attempt at the development of aesthetic political theory. Interestingly, he
says he will literally "construct a model of an 'aesthetic political theory'" (Von Vacano
8). While he acknowledges that Ankersmit's work is an early part of the tradition of
aesthetic political theory, curiously he does not engage the substance of Ankersmit's
contributions directly.
While Von Vacano's understanding of aesthetic political theory emerges from the
thought of Machiavelli and Nietzsche, like that of Ankersmit, he presents aesthetics
theory as an attempt to supplant the dominant ethical paradigm of political thought (Von
Vacano 9 141). There are arguably enough similarities between their arguments that I feel
justified in using the work of Von Vacano to strengthen that of Ankersmit. Although Von
Vacano's work was published over a decade after Ankersmit's first excursion into
aesthetic political theory, there is almost no recognition beyond a single footnote and one
mention by name (Von Vacano 9 n6, 149). Nonetheless, I am comfortable attributing the
similarities between the two theories to a situation like the Newton/Leibniz co-discovery
of calculus. An aesthetic approach to political theory is clearly an idea for which the time
has come.
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Chapter 2: Aesthetic Representation
What an aesthetic approach to representation offers the study of politics is the recognition
that the relationship between representative and represented, government and citizen is
mediated by various factors unintelligible to one who presumes an identity between the
two. The aesthetic gap provides a framework in which questions ofmediation can be
made visible. By exploring the aesthetic framework in which meaningful political
questions can be asked, this project will assist in developing tools for useful theoretical
inquiry.
A clear origin for the aesthetic approach is grounded in the partiality of human
sensory life. If, however, we rely exclusively on this perspectival view of the notion of
aesthetics, as would be tempting to do, we lose much of the richness that the artistic
connotations of aesthetics imply. For example the notion of representation, an artistic
concept, is of central importance to understanding the aesthetic gap, and, therefore more
broadly, politics as a whole. Representation, notes Pitkin in her classic study, is
inarguably a significant component of contemporary politics (Pitkin 2). She also
comments that political representation has often been understood metaphorically in a
variety of ways, some of which clarify, while others obscure. The notion of artistic or
aesthetic representation in particular has the potential to enrich our understanding of
political representation, if one is willing to face the dangers of obscuring the topic that
could arise through an unclear understanding of the term 'representation' (Pitkin 7).
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Ankersmit clearly welcomes the aesthetic connotations of the term representation
(Ankersmit 1996, xiii). In fact, he finds that an axiom of political representation emerges
from the world of art: "the interest of art lies in the fact that there are no fixed and
generally accepted rules to link the represented and its artistic representation . . . there is
no continuity between the ruler (or representative) and the ruled (or represented)"
(Ankersmit 1996, xiv). An aesthetic approach is therefore one that can help transcend
monological understandings ofpolitical phenomena. This is because the very nature of
aesthetics rests on the importance ofperspective, which necessitates the possibility of
multiple points of view. Inherent in an aesthetic approach, then, is the necessary view that
there is more than one way ofunderstanding political phenomena.
Also tacit in an aesthetic understanding of representation is that no image can
exactly recreate what it portrays. There is always a choice on the part of the représenter to
include or omit certain elements of what is represented, for not everything can or should
be included. It is the perspective of the artist that frames the picture, their choice of what
to portray based on individual experience. What is interesting about art is rarely the
accuracy with which a piece portrays some element of the world, but rather how it can
deepen our understanding of the world and ourselves. Completely and accurately
constraining some element of an infinite world into a limited space is impossible
(Nietzsche 65). Any form of representation that seeks this goal is therefore doomed to
failure. One should question, then, the purpose of representation. The key, I believe, is to
be found in a recognition and even a celebration of the limits of representation, in
understanding that any representation inherently assumes a certain point of view or
15
perspective that, while limiting in terms of breadth, simultaneously allows for a deeper
understanding ofthat which is represented.
Art requires distance. If one wishes to view a painting, to appreciate and
potentially interpret it, then pressing one's nose up against it will be of little help. The
painting will only mean something when viewed from a sufficient enough distance to
take it in as a whole. If one considers every word of a poem in particular, or every note of
a symphony individually, then any sense ofunity or coherence of the work will be lost.
Does one have a right to do this? Of course. There are no rules as to how the average
person must engage a work of art. If, however, the role of the viewer is to make some
sense of the artistic whole, such as that of a critic who is to interpret the work, or that of a
political theorist then that individual would find little professional success by speaking
only of the parts. If it is one's profession to interpret, then professional distance in
required.
Furthermore, the notion of distance is crucial to the idea of representation, as
there can be no representation if represented and representative are identical. A bowl of
fruit can be represented in a still life, but the painting does not become the fruit. A
democratically elected counselor supposedly represents her constituents, but in what
sense does she become them? Debates exist in both political and artistic representation as
to whether representation is simply mimetic, that is, an attempt at direct replication, or if
something is revealed in the representation and regarding the role of the counselor in
relation to her constituents. Overlaying artistic metaphors of art and artist onto political
situations is not a straightforward task. Detailing which elements of aesthetic
16
representation are analogous to those ofpolitical representation will be explored
throughout this discussion.
The Paradox of Representation
Representation, like aesthetics, is a term fraught with ambiguity. Unclear definitions are
more likely to obscure than to clarify. In her classic discussion of representation, Pitkin is
well aware of this potential pitfall: "indeed, the literature might almost suggest that
indiscriminate use of improper analogies has been the cause of all the confusion" (Pitkin
7). Her approach to the study of representation is in the tradition of the Ordinary
language philosophy' of Austin, which indicates that the object of her study should
include the way in which the term 'representation' is used in popular discourse.
Furthermore, it involves words related to 'representation' such as 'representative',
'misrepresentation', etc. And while an essential definition of 'political representation'
may grow muddled by exploring the term in this way, the richness ofunderstanding that
may also emerge from such a study is worth the risk. This is especially true when her
"assumption has been that analogies and nonpolitical uses of the word are misleading
only where they are misused, especially where one analogy is taken as definitive, to the
exclusion of all others" (Pitkin 1967, 7).
Without excursing too far afield, I would like to note the affinity for aesthetics
indicated by such an approach. Pitkin's study is not a metaphysics of representation based
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on a priori principles. Instead, she roots her discussion based on observation of how the
term is used in practice. As a reviewer notes:
"rather than attempting to advance and defend a persuasive definition of
the meaning of representative government, she tries to show that much of
the controversy among political theorists over what makes a government
representative is fueled by the failure to notice than any particular
persuasive definition misleadingly presents part of the meaning of
representation as if it were the only meaning" (Fain 110).
Without overly emphasizing this, I wish simply to point out the basic compatibility
between the works of Pitkin and Ankersmit before using both in the same project. In a
way, Pitkin's use of ordinary language philosophy can be seen as a kind of Ankersmittian
aesthetics avant la lettre.
The basic definition that Pitkin gives to the term 'representation', that can apply to
both its political and aesthetic forms, is "the making present in some sense of something
which is nevertheless not present literally or in fact" (Pitkin 8-9) (emphasis author's).
There is something paradoxical about this definition, because, as soon as something
becomes present, it, by definition is no longer absent, and therefore would no longer be in
need of representation. Pitkin is sensitive to the paradox of something both being and not
being present simultaneously, and attempts to resolve it: "something not literally present
is considered as present in a nonliteral sense" (Pitkin 9) (emphasis mine). Ultimately, I
find this resolution unsatisfying. All representation is somewhat metaphorical and thus
not literal. It is no escape from the earlier paradox to argue as such. Conversely, I will
argue that this paradox, ultimately the essential paradox of representation, when
unpacked, can lead to a fruitful understanding of the nature of representation. Rather than
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simply brushing aside this paradox, then, I hope to demonstrate that the impossibility of
something both being and not-being present, this tension between represented and
representative is at the heart ofwhy the aesthetic conception of representation is useful to
politics. Ultimately, I suspect that this paradox is a practical instantiation of Ankersmit's
aesthetic gap.
To reiterate, the essential paradox of representation is the simultaneous and
necessary presence and non-presence ofthat which is represented. For if representation
actually brought the represented into being, made it present, then the act of representation
would involve producing identically that which was not present. But if an object identical
to that which is being represented becomes present, there is no need for representation,
and, indeed, representation becomes impossible, because, as per Pitkin's essential
definition, representation is 'the making present' of something 'not present'.
An example might help clarify this knot of logic. Let's say that I am a sculptor
with magic clay. The clay is magic because, once I shape it into something, it actually
transforms into that thing. So if I were to form the clay into an apple, the sculpture of the
apple would actually transform into an apple, not just in shape, but also in texture, smell,
and taste. Can this apple be said to represent an apple, or would it actually be an apple?
Clearly there is no longer any representation at hand. What this paradox of representation
demonstrates is that, should the representation become identical to that which is
represented, then representation ceases to occur. One might rightly ask whether this is not
simply a word game, with no actual relevance to either the artistic or political realm.
While the consequences of this are not likely readily apparent, they will be significant
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when applied to debates over political representation. In an act of political representation,
what is the apple, who is the sculptor, and what is the clay? What is represented, by
whom, and in what medium or forum?
On the other hand, the representation cannot be wholly disconnected from that
which is represented. While the representation inherently cannot be identical with that
which it represents, there must be some connection, or, to embrace an aesthetic
connotation, there must be some inspiration from the represented. For if this inspiration is
lacking, then there is also no representation, for what was called representation is actually
just its own independent object. Put in terms ofpolitics, we would not say that a member
of government who pursues policy unrelated to the interests of a majority of his or her
constituents in any way represents them (Pitkin 148). This person would be a
representative in name only, and in no way could be said to represent his or her
constituents. Like in the example of the apple, there is no representation.
If there is to be representation, then, a balance must be struck between these two
extremes, and potentially erroneous conceptions of representation. This balance becomes
all the more essential once we realize that these views are extreme of the two sides in
much contemporary debate over the nature of representation. Of these debates, "the
dichotomy between acting as a delegate and acting as a trustee is most fundamentar'
(Pennock 14).
The former case, where the representation attempts to become identical to that
which is represented, exemplifies delegatory or mimetic representation, a situation where
the representative must act as much as possible how a majority of his or her constituents
would act. The latter case, where the link between representative and represented appears
much weaker, exemplifies trusteeship representation, a type of representation with an
affinity for the aesthetic, wherein the representative possesses a certain degree of
independence from his or her constituents. The examples I have given exemplify an
extreme view of each, often proposed by proponents of the other side. What I hope to
show is that while critiques ofmimetic representation remain effective, adopting an
aesthetic approach can circumvent the problems associated with trusteeship
representation.
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Chapter 3: Debating Representation
Before proceeding further into the realm of aesthetics, it is appropriate to here give an
overview of the differences between delegate and trusteeship representation. Pitkin
ultimately classifies this debate as irresolvable (Pitkin 145-146). Especially relevant for
discussions of democratic representation, this discussion centres on the degree of freedom
representatives should have regarding the wishes of their constituents. To what degree,
the question goes, should a representative be bound to the wishes of their constituents, as
opposed to possessing the independence to pursue ends they believe best for the
community (Pitkin 41). Addressing this question entails going to the heart of what
representation is in politics.
The problem of representation has, broadly speaking [since the beginning
of the Eighteenth Century], been concerned with the question of when and
under what circumstances governments, as far as composition and
decision-making go, are a reflection of the mind of the people.
(Ankersmit 1996, 25) (emphasis mine)
This time frame could be expanded by half a century to the 1651 publication of Hobbes'
Leviathan, arguably one of the first sustained arguments on the nature of political
representation (Pitkin 14). Before, proceeding to a discussion of Hobbes' conception of
representation, there is one crucial element of Ankersmit' s definition that should be
identified, for it will be crucial in the discussion of political representation to follow.
By drawing attention to the reflective nature of representation, Ankersmit sows
the seeds of the constituent nature of aesthetics to representation (Ankersmit 1996, 38-9).
Reflecting or representing 'the mind of the people' requires a perspective that is both
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external to and separate from that mind, further reinforcing the gap between
representative and represented. This perspective is not part of the representation, in that it
is not itself the mind of the people, but rather the perspective from which this mind is
observed. Perspective, or point of view, is thus an essential component of representation.
"As landscape cannot determine from what perspective it is seen, so the representation
always contains an element that is essential to its representationability and that can never
be reduced to the world itselfand to what is true and false" (Ankersmit 1996, 39). The
representation thus cannot be identical with that which it represents. If it were, it would
cease to be useful in any meaningful way (Ankersmit 1996, 40). As was demonstrated,
this idea is part of the essence of the paradox of representation: representation requires
difference, else there is no representation. While this appears tautological, it leads to the
useful principle that forms of representation that presuppose identity between
representative and represented are, in fact, not representations, but something else.
This line of reasoning is useful in that it allows us to demonstrate that while many
authors claim to discuss representation, and that while many politicians claim to be acting
as representatives, they are not. The former group would include theorists, such as James
Madison for whom government, if it is to possess any legitimacy, must seek to recreate or
mimic the mind of the people in its decisions (Pitkin 146). Regarding the politicians, the
nature of government by plebiscite becomes a questionable affair, in that no longer
simply the mind of the people is being reflected, but also their decisions as to how they
would act. This, which ultimately amounts to a type of non-representation, is referred to
as a 'mimetic theory of representation' (Ankersmit 1996, 28), which is to be contrasted
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with an 'aesthetic theory of representation* (Ankersmit 1996, 45), one which satisfies the
condition of a necessary separateness between representative and represented.
Something to bear in mind as the different forms of representation are discussed
regards the constitution of the representative. Are representatives simply substitutes for
the fact that large populations make it impossible for every individual citizen to be
assembled or to be consulted? For as communications technology becomes more
efficient, polling more sophisticated, the idea of assembling all citizens, or at least their
opinions becomes less problematic. Representation is often seen as necessary if and only
if the political community cannot be assembled any other way (Plotke 19-20). If a
mimetic view of representation is problematic, however, then the direction in which
democracy is moving should prove troubling.
Any type of regime throughout history can be said to 'represent' the citizens of
that regime (Ankersmit 1996, 24). Whether or not citizens 'feel' represented is another
matter that shall be investigated. Whether a regime is effective or ineffective at
representing its citizens, although initially bearing the appearance of a normative
question, is, in fact, a question of 'feeling' on the part of those citizens, and is thus an
aesthetic question. On this point, Ankersmit and Pitkin are in agreement: "Whether a -
state represents its people is a question of taste, of a feeling of the part of those
represented" (Ankersmit 1996, 23). "...whether its representative institutions are
'meaningful'" (Pitkin 45). The aesthetic approach thus situates normative questions
regarding a particular regime within a broader question of the effectiveness of the
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representation of citizens within the regime. As we will see, democratic regimes have the
potential to facilitate this sense of feeling represented.
Aesthetic political theory thus opposes the mimetic and delegatory conception of
representation, one that presumes an identity between the government and the citizen. An
aesthetic approach is thus sympathetic to models of democracy where the representative
acts as agent of the represented without attempting to embody the will of the represented.
Aesthetic representation, in contrast to mimetic representation, does not try to simply ape
voter preferences, but create something new that refers to those preferences, while
remaining distinct from them (Ankersmit 1996, 45). What aesthetic representation offers
to politics is the recognition that the relationship between representative and represented,
government and citizen is mediated by various factors that are invisible to someone who
presumes an identity between these two. In enumerating and exploring these factors, this
mediation, we will not fall victim to a false sense of the political will of the electorate,
but will begin to understand the best possible picture of what the electorate might wish to
do. This is the closest approximation we have to political reality, and therefore, for all
intents and purposes, this representation is political reality; it is created in its
representation (Ankersmit 1 996, 46-7).
Mimetic Representation
A mimetic or delegatory conception of representation is characterized explicitly by the
responsibility and accountability of the representative to the represented. Pitkin
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comments that the typical attitude of such a representative is to "act as if your
constituents were acting themselves" (Pitkin 144).
In what could be called the accountability view, the representative has a new
obligation or responsibility to the represented, a responsibility that did not previously
exist "Where authorization theorists see the representative as free, the represented as
bound, accountability theorists see precisely the converse" (Pitkin 55). Pitkin
characterizes the accountability view as a negative reaction to preexisting authorization
views of representation, an attempt at correcting what is seen as not actually
representative (Pitkin 57). The accountability view, however, is incomplete, as it, on its
own, provides no account of what the representative will do, just what the representative
will be responsible^ (Pitkin 58).
This view has, historically, had some influential proponents among political
architects: "[a representative legislature] should be an exact portrait, in miniature, of the
people at large, as it should think, feel, reason and act like them" (John Adams, quoted in
Pitkin, 60). "The metaphors of portrait, map, and mirror have this in common: all are
renderings of an 'original' in a medium different from it" (Pitkin 72-3) They involve a
representing very different from that defined by the formalistic theorists, primarily a
'standing for' something or someone absent some correspondence of features (Pitkin 80).
Pitkin notes that this form of representation does not require activity, that is, specific
action on the part of the representative, only some sense of likeness, or similarity between
representative and represented. Thus the actions of representatives are not what is
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important, but what they are like (Pitkin 80-1). Notably, since this definition is based on
'being', not 'doing', it can apply equally to art as to people (Pitkin 81).
"Whatever the legislature does will be what the whole nation would have done in
its place; so no one will have right or reason to complain. A copy sufficiently like an
original can be substituted for the original without making any difference" (Pitkin 84). A
small community is more conducive to the individual expression of opinion. As
communities grow, however, some method of 'proxy' voting is required. Effectively, the
representative becomes the proxy for all constituents (Pitkin 85). Rousseau, however,
provides one of the earliest accounts of the logical rejection of the possibility of mimetic
representation in this spirit (Ankersmit 1996, 28-29). For Rousseau, only an identity
between the will of the citizens and their representative constitutes representation. It is
either their will, or something else, and if something else, then not their will. Since this
recreation of will is impossible, so too is representation.
If one calls to mind Hobbes' artificial person, who is authorized by the natural
persons that are the constituency (Hobbes 120), one can even begin to question how this
sort of representative is a person at all, because no human judgment, beyond the ability to
accurately portray the will of the constituency is required in the representative. This sort
of representative is nothing more than an intermediary, effectively a technological
instrument for compiling and conveying constituent information. Media commentator
Tony Schwartz points to the logical extension of this view:
The basic reason for having representative government is that all the
people cannot themselves be at the seat of government. Therefore we call
on others to speak for us. But with the new technologies, for all practical
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purposes we can be there, and we may not need representatives, because
we now represent ourselves (Schwartz 160-1).
If all representatives do is reflect the mind of the people, advancing communications
technology should be able to fulfill this role more efficiently and inexpensively. "For if
the representation has to be the represented' s indiscernible twin, we could just as well do
with represented reality alone and abandon representation as a dangerous and useless
detour" (Ankersmit 1996, 44). One can begin to see how mimetic views of representation
are actually anti-representational in that, when takes to the logical extreme, representation
is completely unnecessary.
The counterpoint to this view being "on the many issues on which people have no
will, or do not know what they want, 'there is nothing for the representatives to
represent'" (Pitkin 83). So long as those opinions that are possessed by constituents are
represented, successful representation is at hand. The representative is more like an artist
or mapmaker than a portrait or map (Pitkin 84). There is an active quality to the
representative that, leaving aside debates over artificial intelligence, cannot be recreated
technologically, as the Schwartzes of the world would have. Here we find the clear link
between an aesthetic approach to representation that sees the representative as an artist,
applying their perspective and making choices, and the trustee model of representation.
One can begin to see the dangers of mimetic representation if one considers the role of
polling data in representative government. To presume a mimetic view of representation
would be to argue that selection of representative by lot or random sampling is as
effective a way of recreating an image of the population as any form of election.
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Therefore, politicians need only to pay attention to polls, rather than election results
(Pitkin 73-4). Clearly, this method would only be representative, not to say democratic, if
recreating public opinion exactly were a property ofrepresentation. But, as was
demonstrated, this view is paradoxical, and thus governing by poll is a contradiction in
terms.
Mimetic representation necessarily leads to either illegitimate authority, due to the
impossibility of accurately mimicking the electorate, or to no authority at all, as was
articulated by Rousseau. Someone claiming legitimate authority based on the accuracy of
their representation would thus find it impossible to do so. Mimetic representation leads
to either dictatorship or anarchy, not democratic representation. "Political power has its
origin neither in the people represented nor in the representative, but in the representation
process itself (Ankersmit 1996, 53). "Political reality is not first given to us and
subsequently represented; political reality only comes into being after and due to
representation" (Ankersmit 1996, 47).
Regardless of any logical incoherence in the character of mimetic representation,
many allowances can be made for its acceptability as a political system if it works. If
mimetic representation is able to create some form of effective representation, then it may
possess some historical value. Judging this would require examining mimetic
representation on its own merits, in order to discover whether or not it fulfills what it, as a
system, sets out to do.
"Behind all the applications of the descriptive view to political life hovers the
recurrent ideal of the perfect replica, the flawless image, the map which contains
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everything" (Pitkin 86). As Pitkin notes, even an exact replica, were such a thing
politically possible, must be 'read' or interpreted, and furthermore, only that which is
portrayed can be interpreted. The question arises as to what elements of the political
constituency should be represented, portrayed by the representative, which elements of
the mind of the people should be politicized. What Pitkin is attempting to demonstrate is
that this descriptive view of representation is impossible, or at least unlikely, at any
practical level. At the theoretical level, if the correspondence between representative and
represented cannot be guaranteed, then any representative edifice built on mimesis begins
to crumble (Pitkin 88).
When examined, the criteria of likeness for representation, in that the
representative is 'like' the represented, becomes problematic. Is a lunatic the best
representative of other lunatics (Pitkin 89)? More complicated, however, is the issue of
identity politics, one that merits closer scrutiny. In a case such as gender or ethnicity, it is
not mere outward appearance that qualifies the appropriate representative, but an outward
appearance indicative of certain inner qualities or experiences. For our purposes, two
elements emerge from a discussion of identity in representation, one relating to the
formation of interests, and the other to the legitimacy of representation.
Representation based on interest contains the tacit assumption that those interests
can be articulated on the part of the constituents and communicated to the representative.
Articulating those interests in an organized manner does not necessarily mean, however,
that those interests are any less valid than ones that have historically been successfully
articulated (Mansbridge 643-4). Furthermore, when issues arise that involve the interests
of a particular community, there is an argument to be made that a descriptive
representative will engage the issue more vigorously than would another. This becomes
particularly relevant in an environment of trusteeship representation, where the
representatives are acting as they think best for their constituents (Mansbridge 646).
The second relevant element to be drawn from identity politics regards the question of
legitimacy. Within an aesthetic context, seeing someone like oneself, particularly if one
has been historically underrepresented, acting as representative can make one feel
represented (Mansbridge 650), a crucial element of aesthetic representation.
It is within the scope of identity politics that one can begin to see an interesting
link between mimetic representation and aesthetic representation, for if a person can be
said to represent others, not through their actions, but due to who they are, then that
person represents insofar as she or he symbolizes her or his constituency, is like them,
understands them. The key to symbolism is the sharing of certain characteristics that
allow the observer to make certain inferences about the meaning of the symbol (Pitkin
94). Also key to the notion of symbolism is the notion of qualities that are shared
between the symbol and symbolized, rather that visible characteristics (Pitkin 95). "To
say that something symbolizes something else is to say that it calls to mind, and even
beyond that evokes emotions or attitudes appropriate to the absent thing" (Pitkin 96).
The qualities Pitkin attributes to symbolism, however, are aesthetic: "We can
never exhaust, never quite capture in words, the totality of what a symbol symbolizes:
suggests, evokes, implies" (Pitkin 97). Recall Nietzsche's comment about the infinitude
of nature. A symbol thus shares characteristics with a work of art, in that a particular
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verbal explanation will be insufficient to offer a comparison between symbol and
symbolized. Northrop Frye comments that one of the most ridiculous questions a
composer can be asked is what a certain melody 'means' (Frye 70). "A symbol cannot
simply be 'exchanged with what it symbolizes'" (Tindall, quoted in Pitkin 98). They are
not translatable via a certain algorithm, a key characteristic of aesthetic representation.
"Rather than a source of information, the symbol seems to be the recipient or
object of feelings, expressions of feeling, or actions intended for what it represents
(Pitkin 99). Pitkin cautions against prioritizing a symbolic understanding of
representation above others because "representing people will seem no different from
symbolizing an abstraction like a nation" (Pitkin 102). She warns of the dangers of
symbolic representation, arguing that rather than actually representing, the representative
will be the one who attempts to symbolize the represented, one in whom the constituency
believes (Pitkin 1 02). A certain element of pageantry and ritual is visible in most political
environments (Pitkin 103).
Furthermore, a purely symbolic conception of representation is incomplete. If it
were complete, then representation would be identical to satisfying the constituents
(Pitkin 109). As we will see, a 'feeling' on the part of constituents as to whether or not
they are represented is an important, underdeveloped element of political representation,
especially among mimetic theorists. As Pitkin argues, however, feeling is far from a
sufficient explanation for effective representation (Pitkin 1 1 1). I will argue, however, that
a 'feeling' of being represented is strongly connected to whether or not a representative
can be considered legitimate.
Aesthetic Trusteeship
32
How can a representative access and interpret the 'feelings' of the constituency? As
Burke notes:
We are the expert artists; we are the skillful workmen, to shape their
desires into perfect form, and to fit the utensil to the use ... They are the
sufferers, to tell the symptoms of the complaint; but we know the exact
seat of the disease, and how to apply the remedy (Burke, quoted in Pitkin,
184).
Out of a discussion of Burke's understanding of representation, as exemplified by his
Letter to the Electors of Bristol, Pitkin begins to explore the most reliable access
representatives have to the 'mind of the people', not opinion, but feeling (Pitkin 183).
"Unlike opinions, feelings are reliable; and people are seldom mistaken when they
perceive a pain or symptom, be it physical or political. It is only when they attempt to
speculate abstractly on the basis of what they feel that they go astray into opinion" (Pitkin
183). In the aesthetic realm, the realm of feeling, we thus have the most unmediated,
direct access to what is of concern to the constituency, what they feel strongly about.
"The virtue, spirit and essence of a House of Commons consists in its being the express
image of the feelings of the nation" (Burke, quoted in Pitkin 183). In this view,
"representing is trusteeship, an elite caring for others" (Pitkin 172).
Trusteeship representation is rooted in what Pitkin calls the 'authorization view',
one that grows out of Hobbes' understanding of representation (Pitkin 38). The core of
this understanding grows from Hobbes' definition of person, not to be taken as identical
to 'human being' (Pitkin 1 5). Person implies a certain relationship to either the ownership
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of one's own actions, or the representation of actions owned by another (Hobbes 120).
Representation, for Hobbes, essentially involves acting on behalf of another, with the
responsibility for the action lying with the owner of the actions, and the freedom to act
being owned by the representative (Hobbes 120). This comes about by an act of
authorization by the represented.
Authority is given at the outset of the representative relationship, with the limits
and character of how the representative will represent the represented being defined at
that point. "Representation implies standards for, or limits on, the conduct of the
representative" (Pitkin 33). Pitkin further notes that within this view, representation
cannot possess good or bad qualities, it simply is or is not. If the representative follows
the predetermined nature of the authorization, representation is occurring, else not (Pitkin
39). How this act of authorization occurs is relevant, if one wishes to consider the
character of a particular regime.
"For the theorist of representative democracy working from an authorization
definition, the crucial criterion becomes elections, and these are seen as a grant of
authority by the voters to the elected officials" (Pitkin 43). Effectively, elections are the
renewal of the authorization of the representatives. Elections are acts of "vesting
authority" (Pinney, quoted in Pitkin 43). Just because this authority is not permanent does
not make it any less authoritative. Simply because the results of an election will endure
for a limited time in no way limits the essential character of the representation. While
representatives may act in ways to attempt to influence the results of the succeeding
election, this is an accident of the constitution of the particular regime, and not of
34
representation as a whole (Tussman, quoted in Pitkin 43). Pitkin points out, however, that
while elections are accidental, they are also necessary. For authorization to take place,
there must be the act of 'vesting authority', which, in representative democracies, occur
with elections. Thus there can be no democratic representation without elections (Pitkin
43). Ultimately, however, authorization views of representation are of limited use for
understanding the rich variety of connotations that representation implies (Pitkin 48-9).
Pitkin continues by pointing out that, contrary to any elitist notions about what is 'best'
for the community, that the individual is the best judge of their own feelings, that they are
"the only reliable authority" (Pitkin 1 84). The job of the representative is thus to
understand these feelings, and be considerate of them in the act of representation. The
heart, and not the mind, of the people become paramount. However "this accurate
reflection of popular feelings does not constitute representation for Burke so much as it is
a prerequisite for representation" (Pitkin 1 84).
There is a danger where this freedom (from the representative's constituents)
might go too far, that the representative has no relationship with their constituents. Even
more dangerously, if we come to understand the representative as an artist, questions as
to the raw material on which the artist works will surely arise. If the goal of the
representative becomes to shape the represented, the relationship that is traditionally
assumed to exist between them will have been reversed in a particularly perverse manner.
While I wish to maintain the role of representative as political artist, I believe a much
more fruitful understanding than raw material can be found for the public. I will argue
that their role has become threefold. One of these, that of subject, is passive, but the other
35
two, critic and patron, posses a mutually constitutive relationship with their government,
thus reclaiming political power.
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Chapter 4: Distance, Indifference, and the Aesthetic Gap
The clearest link between aesthetics and politics, and therefore the most succinct point of
origin of the aesthetic political framework, can be found in the work of Machiavelli. As
such, the relevant passage is worth reproducing in its entirety:
For just as those who sketch landscapes place themselves down in the
plain to consider the nature of mountains and high places and to consider
the nature of low places place themselves high atop mountains, similarly,
to know well the nature of peoples one needs to be prince, and to know
well the nature ofprinces one needs to be of the people (Machiavelli, 4).
I would like to make two comments about the form of this citation that I find noteworthy.
The first is the metaphorical comparison between politics and art. I find it appropriate
that the origin of the aesthetic political theory emerges from an artistic metaphor. The
second is that Machiavelli employs a metaphor (technically a simile) to describe the role
of the theorist. To understand the other, he writes, one must act like a painter. Metaphor
clearly has a specific role to play in aesthetic political theory and in politics itself.
On the subject of employing metaphor in a political context, Ankersmit suggests
the work of Donald Schön: "My point here is not that we ought to think metaphorically
about social policy problems but that we already do think about them in terms of certain
pervasive generative metaphors ... [which] generate new perceptions and inventions"
(Ankersmit 1996, 261). Understanding a political problem in terms of a particular
metaphor will generate and imply certain solutions. "Metaphors, as conceived by Schön,
are the missing link between the 'is' and the Ought"' (Ankersmit 1996, 261). Metaphor is
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neither description nor action. The metaphors that describe a political problem arise from
the story, the narrative, that is told about the problem (Ankersmit 1996, 262).
Metaphor is a linguistic trope that creates meaning through the tension between
the literal meaning of a phrase and its actual meaning. Metaphor allows the individuation
of a point ofview. This reinforces the individuality of a particular narrative, which is
descriptive of, but simultaneously different from, the actual event recounted (Ankersmit
1996, 262-263). Rhetoric enters the picture in relation to narrative, in that rhetoric
employs metaphors (Ankersmit 1 996, 265).
Rhetoric necessitates an understanding of the self and the other and which
associations are appropriate. Metaphor could be a necessary precondition to political
participation. Metaphors organize knowledge, unity arises from the pattern of
organization (Ankersmit 1996, 266). "A good metaphor may be so successful at
organizing knowledge that it even suggests a certain course of action" (Ankersmit 1996,
320). What course of action, then, is suggested by Machiavelli's metaphor?
Before addressing this question and proceeding with the analysis, I believe it is
worth repeating Ankersmit's definition of the character of aesthetic political theory:
In contrast to the appetite for systematic exposition that we always find in
political theory and in political science, aesthetic political theory
ordinarily has the character of a series of aphoristic observations
concerned with the practice of politics, which cannot be systematized ... It
can perhaps best be put on a par with the great art of fictional writing, with
its independent insights into the contingencies of human existence
(Ankersmit 1996, 121).
Whether this definition can be applied directly to Machiavelli's metaphor remains to be
seen. Nonetheless, I believe it important to bear in mind as we proceed.
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Machiavelli's passage reveals the two primary characteristics of aesthetic political
theory. The first is that politics brings into being a necessary division between people and
prince. The meek and the mighty are the two essential humors of politics (Mansfield 34,
Von Vacano 139). Mansfield notes that while these humors are opposed to each other,
with a desire to dominate defining the prince, and a desire to avoid domination defining
the people, they do not contradict each other (Mansfield 34). What separates an aesthetic
approach to political theory from other contemporary approaches, such as liberalism, is
that the political order does not emerge simply from the will of individual citizens, nor
from the impositions of the government (Ankersmit 1996, 7), but emerges from the space
between these two, from their mutual constitution. They thus have a mutually constitutive
relationship.
Once this necessary division is understood, one can proceed to the second
characteristic of aesthetic political theory, and that is these two humors imply a necessary
limited perspective. Each can see the other, but neither can see itself. Regardless of one's
station, one is limited by one's point of view. From this, we can understand that the two
fundamental elements to be drawn from aesthetics are that politics is both partial and
perspectival. Ankersmit further divides this second characteristic into two. Perspectives
are in general limited, and are specifically limited from observing themselves (Ankersmit
1996, 18). Nonetheless, I believe that the aesthetic approach can most straightforwardly
be understood by realizing that the perspective of all actors is limited, limited in such a
way as to exclude self understanding, and that this limited perspective leads to a gap
between governed and government. "Neither side understands, or can be brought to
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understand, the other" (Mansfield 34). Taking these premises as the fundamental
characteristics of the aesthetic framework, one can begin a move to examine what politics
means in such a framework.
Perspective, limitation, and finitude are thus all characteristics of the citizen,
aesthetically conceived. Once these characteristics are recognized in the political regime,
the dangers of totalitarianism melt away. Conversely, should they be ignored, those
dangers are all the more present. Much has been made of the political nature of man.
Aristotle gave the study of politics the highest place in his studies, encompassing, to a
degree, all other aspects of human life (Aristotle, Book 1). For Ankersmit, any political
theory rooted solely in the preferences of the individual is vulnerable to a totalitarian
impulse (Ankersmit 1996, 7-8). For if individual will is the only measure of what is
defined as a political question, then all human volition potentially falls within the realm
of politics. The essence of totalitarianism, according to Lefort, is the identity between the
citizens and the state (Lefort 73). Proof against totalitarianism requires a view of politics,
arguably an aesthetic one, that is sensitive to what elements of life should be politicized,
and which should not. "The only solid foundation of the individual's freedom must, by
contrast, be situated in the recognition that there is a sphere that will forever and
inexorably remain beyond the reach of even our collective will" (Ankersmit 1996, 8). We
must find the line where the forest becomes the trees, and vice versa.
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Totalitarianism
Ironically, an aesthetic conception of politics has traditionally born a strong association
with totalitarian regimes, although Ankersmit notes that his conception of aesthetics
differs diametrically from previous accounts. Most 19th and 20th century thinkers who
have employed the notion of aesthetics assume that political unity is what is beautiful,
and therefore what is to be strived for (Ankersmit 1996, 17-18). This aesthetic criterion
can thus all too easily justify a totalitarian state, one in which the citizenry is united with
the state.
Lefort's work on totalitarianism emerges from a discussion of the properties of
Soviet Russia, which he describes as: "a universe governed by a necessity in which every
action was mechanically linked to every other" (Lefort 57). He continues: "Civil society
cannot be absorbed into the state ... in the context of a bureaucratic [totalitarian] regime,
[however] such a separation is abolished" (Lefort 73). In other words, there is no
aesthetic gap in a totalitarian state. Totalitarianism requires a mechanical, metaphysical
environment in which to flourish.
For an aesthetic conception of representative democracy, then, brokenness and not
unity becomes the aesthetic criterion of value (Ankersmit 1996, 17-18). There is a space,
the aesthetic gap, between citizen and government, people and prince, without which
representation becomes impossible (Ankersmit 1996, 18). Therefore if representation is
necessarily constitutive of democracy, so to is the aesthetic gap. By the same token, any
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understandings of politics that seek to close or eliminate this gap are actually anti-
democratic in orientation or intent.
As we move towards an aesthetic conception of representation, a sense that
totalitarianism has the potential to emerge is revealed. While a thorough comparative
exercise between democratic and totalitarian or fascistic representation is beyond the
scope of this exercise, a nod toward that discussion may be appropriate to avoid overly
derailing this argument. Von Vacano points out, "to aestheticize politics is not the same
thing as finding that politics as such is aesthetic in nature" (Von Vacano 186) (Emphasis
author's). Fascists would be guilty of the former, aesthetic political theorists of the latter.
Ultimately, fascism is a form of totalitarianism, grounded in the unification of points of
view (Von Vacano 188). Ankersmit's aesthetic view of politics, by contrast, is one that
recognizes the 'necessary brokenness' of the political domain, (Ankersmit 1996, 119) not
its unity. An aesthetic view is thus inherently anti-totalitarian. Whether or not that can be
said of a mimetic understanding ofpolitics remains to be seen.
This unification of people and politics leads to two possibilities, neither of which
is particularly palatable. The first is that politics ceases to be a meaningful unit of
analysis. As Ankersmit observes: "that which is everywhere is nowhere" (Ankersmit
1996, 65). There would be no point in privileging the theoretical study of politics as an
independent discipline, and a metaphysical study of ethics, which might take its place,
would likely have little to say about the actual practice ofpolitics.
The second is, of course, a totalitarian state. Von Vacano offers an excellent
description of the aesthetic qualities of such an environment:
42
When the statesman thinks of the masses as inert matter to be molded once
they have been 'an-aesthecized' by being treated merely as objects and not
as persons, then the tyrannical urge that Ankersmit fears is bound to rear
its ugly head. Fascism indeed had an aesthetic dimension to it, yet this was
of a kind different from the aesthetics (sic?) politics that can still be found
in other forms ofpolitics (Von Vacano 1 68).
He continues, however: "To be a political leader that thinks of himself as an artist who
shapes the world in the manner of Mussolini is not the same as discovering that aesthetic
categories such as representation, expression, and form are applicable to all sorts of
political endeavors" (Von Vacano 186).
Von Vacano' s point is that an aesthetic approach to politics is not inherently
totalitarian. In fact, only an aesthetic approach is equipped to identify and then grapple
with all of the artistic qualities of totalitarianism. One cannot hope to address "the terrible
possibilities of propaganda and the manifold problems of lying that they involve" (Hutter
7) without first adopting an aesthetic framework. This is not to say that propaganda is, in
and of itself, a purely totalitarian tool. As ElIuI reveals, the actual regime type is
incidental to its use of propaganda (Ellul ix). An aesthetic study of the role of propaganda
in various regime types is beyond the scope of this exercise, but would likely prove
fascinating. To be clear, just because an aesthetic approach allows for the consideration
of the use of propaganda and misrepresentation by a regime does not mean that this
approach inherently endorses a totalitarian view. The use of propaganda and public
spectacle exists in all regime types. While the content of these events may differ, an
aesthetic approach allows for an attempt at understanding.
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Ethics and Morality
An aesthetic approach to political theory can therefore be seen as differing from other
approaches to politics in its relationship to ethics or morality. Others may see ethics as a
hard limit to what sort of questions can be engaged with, namely those of right and
wrong. These are questions that can only be asked and answered normatively, in terms of
ought or should. Ankersmit gives the work of Hobbes and Bodin on absolute sovereignty
as an example of why political theory must transcend the moral in order to effectively
address the political problems of the day. Many involved in fighting the religious civil
wars of the 16th and 17th centuries would have believed that what they were doing was
morally right, especially given the religious, and therefore moral character of the
conflicts. Only by reframing the nature ofmoral political association were Hobbes and
Bodin able to suggest reasonable political alternatives to the slaughter. Until the idea of
an undivided leviathan to which one's loyalty was solely pledged, it was considered
perfectly ethical to eliminate Catholics or Protestants in order to achieve harmony by
homogenizing the body politic. By suggesting that loyalty to a sovereign was not a matter
of ethical choice, but a logical necessity according to natural law, these theorists were
able to address the collective suicide in which Europe was engaged (Ankersmit 1996, 11).
These two theorists were not engaged in idle metaphysical speculation, but were instead
addressing a concrete political problem. "The political theorist" charges Ankersmit "has
to be a mechanic rather than a designer of political machines, and ... the universalism of
the designer of completely new political machines will inevitably doom the political
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theorist to academic irrelevance" (Ankersmit 1996, 5). A political theorist, then, cannot
derive the problems that he or she might address from a priori principles without risking
irrelevance in the practical world. An aesthetic approach is premised on the idea that the
origins of political arrangements are understood to be limited by human sensory
experience, that is, by perspective.
Aesthetic theory attempts to transcend the normative prescriptions and 'oughts'
that so often exemplify the objects of concern for political theory. An ethical approach
almost necessarily entails acting as a 'designer', according to Ankersmit's metaphor. It
becomes therefore irrelevant, if not outright dangerous, when the subject of the theory
fails to meet the required design standards for the imagined political machine. An element
of aesthetic political theory therefore involves identifying situations where moral political
theory is either misleading, dangerous, or both, and reframing the question to work
toward a solution. "Ethics [morals], by its very nature, is not interested in unintended
consequences ... and is therefore a powerful generator of unintended consequences if
applied to politics" (Ankersmit 1996, 219-220). An aesthetic approach, by contrast, is
sensitive to unintended consequences through its recognition of notions such as political
irony, and other aesthetic tropes co-opted for the use of political theorists.
The aesthetic approach, in the form I am discussing, is a relatively new addition to
contemporary political theory. As such, I believe it would be productive to situate
aesthetics in relation to preexisting traditions. The aesthetic approach is very much the
antithesis of the metaphysical, ethical approach that dominates much of Western political
discourse. That being said, the goal of this project is not to coherently define and then
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attempt to overthrow the existing paradigm. Pre-established theories will only be
discussed to the degree that it can help with an elucidation of the aesthetic framework; In
this, I follow Ankersmit and Von Vacano, who each attempt to define their vision of
aesthetic political theory in contrast to Rawlsian liberalism. My overall project is not an
all-encompassing critique of liberalism, but rather entails a positive definition of the
aesthetic political framework. Nonetheless, a point of departure is required, and this one
seems as appropriate as any.
The inherent disorder in politics revealed by aesthetic political theory is only
problematic if one chooses to ignore it. Just because a theoretical approach cannot be
used to understand the conflictual nature ofpolitics does not mean that that conflict does
not exist. Political conflict itself is not necessarily problematic, so long as it does not lead
to the breakdown of the regime. Unfortunately, this is precisely what alternative
approaches miss. This ignorance, Ankersmit argues, lies at the root of much confusion
within contemporary political theory. He awards the introduction ofhis work Aesthetic
Politics the provocative title 'Against Ethics,' and sets up the aesthetic approach with a
blistering attack on the liberal approach of Rawls. An attack on the approach advocated
in A Theory ofJustice is essential, because the premises of- that work have essentially
defined the type of questions addressed by political theorists in the late twentieth century
and those premises neglect the inherent disorder ofpolitical life, and attempt to establish
a paradigm wherein consensus is considered the ultimate political good (Ankersmit 1996,
3). While this reading of Rawls is "uncharitable (to say the least)" (Ivison 803), it may
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prove necessary due to the latter' s predominance in the contemporary study of political
theory.
Simply put, the problem with Rawls' s approach is that he supplants descriptive
questions of politics with normative questions of ethics. Rawls's main question is
regarding "how welfare and income ought to be distributed in the just society"
(Ankersmit 1996, 3 emphasis author's). The study of politics becomes a question of
analyzing what should be done, ignoring the "nasty and refractory problems that politics
and the politician come across daily and must try to solve as well as they can" (Ankersmit
1996, 4). Furthermore, as Von Vacano reveals, by employing the concept of "the
'reasonable' as a baseline criteria forjudging political action, normative theorists, such as
Rawls unwittingly root their framework for judgment within a particular cultural
tradition, for there is no guarantee that what appears 'reasonable' in one culture will in
another (Von Vacano 1 55).
By universalizing seemingly political questions, Rawls's approach severs those
questions from the actual political and historical circumstances in which they arise.
Hobbes and Bodin both offered detailed descriptions of the logical necessity of a unified
sovereign in the language of natural law. While one could take their works as nothing
more than metaphysical treaties on the subject, by taking into account the historical
backdrop of the religious wars of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, it becomes
apparent that a pressing political need informs their approach (Ankersmit 1 996, 4).
"Grounded on the notion that the traditional (deontological) ethical basis of political
theory can become too removed from reality and the possible, this new [aesthetic]
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approach urges for a creative way of thinking about how to analyze politics" (Von
Vacano 141).
We can easily see that a Rawlsian understanding of politics must blind itself to
certain elements of politics. By grounding politics in the honest discussions between
rational actors, such an approach has no use for deception. Misrepresentation or
propaganda would then not be considered as part of the political process, but rather an
aberration, effectively saying that those events are not political, but a perversion of or
deviation from the political. The Rawlsian approach thus limits those who employ it from
engaging political objects that have influence over actual political situations. Rawlsian
liberalism is thus not aesthetic, but anesthetic.
Rawlsian liberalism, like most contemporary political theory, situates the
individual as the origin of the political order, and therefore all properties of the political
order can be reduced to the individual (Ankersmit 1996, 7). This premise, however,
betrays a simple logical fallacy that the whole is not the sum of its parts. The mistaken
presumption of this theoretical approach is that there is an intrinsic 'translatability'
between the individual and the political, in contrast to the broken world of aesthetic
political theory. This notion of translatability is one of the most relevant points of
departure of aesthetic political theory from competing traditions, in that if this infinite
translatability is allowed, in contrast to aesthetic theory, a totalitarian impulse emerges.
Ankersmit's aesthetic approach resists this infinite translatability. Returning to the
central premise of the aesthetic gap, if one takes Machiavellian perspectivism seriously,
any sort of unity between people and prince becomes impossible. This unity, in addition
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to being a criterion of Rawlsian liberalism, is arguably also the central goal of totalitarian
regimes. This is not to suggest that Rawlsian liberalism is necessarily totalitarian, but
rather the need to reject, as part of its essence, this necessary element of totalitarianism.
A charge that the underpinnings of a certain direction in the study of politics
might not matter to the world beyond the academy is not, in and of itself, sufficient to
dismiss that direction. If practical relevance were the sole criteria of value for a theory,
much excellent work would be ignored. A much more successful line of criticism would
be one that could reveal that, Rawls's theoretical direction, rather than explaining
political phenomena, only adds to the confusion surrounding politics, and obscures what
is the ultimate object of political study. Because of confusion over the nature of
representation, coupled with the widespread and uncritical acceptance of Rawls' point of
view, citizens are becoming confused about the purpose of their state (Ankersmit 1 996,
67-68). For ultimately, a political regime is structured in the way that it is in order to
solve certain parochial problems brought about by social living.
49
Chapter 5: An Aesthetic Compromise
Bearing in mind the necessity of perspective for representation, and also being aware of
difficulties that arise from an overly moralistic approach to politics, we can now move to
a positive definition ofhow the aesthetic approach can enliven our understanding of
politics, in particular, representative democracy. It is reasonable to ask what we are
looking at when we attempt to define representative democracy. Ultimately, it is a
political system, or form of regime. What can this tell us? "Each political system is,
above all, a system for conflict control, and that the nature of a political system is
therefore determined to a large degree by the kind of social and political conflicts for
which it pretends to offer a successful solution" (Ankersmit 1996, 123). We can therefore
observe in a political system the problems that it attempts to solve. If, and only if, we are
also able to observe problems that the system is not addressing, are we justified in
arguing that the system is insufficient or flawed. What problems, then, is representative
democracy attempting to address?
We have previously established the necessity of recognizing perspectivism and
human partiality, which leads to two interesting and related political implications. They
are a lack of, for all practical purposes, overarching moral structures that govern political
action, and the role of passion and emotion in human decision-making. Given this,
political problems should most productively be boiled down to conflicts between people
(as the possessors of political opinions) and not between political ideals. For if two sets of
political ideals, residing within the realm of logic and possessing the same logical
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coherence, are incommensurable, then reconciling those ideals within the realm of
practical democratic politics becomes impossible. There is no theoretically compelling
reason for accepting one over the other, as each simply depends on a different point of
view. Any reason for accepting one set of principles would be contingent on practical
political factors, be they a democratic majority or force of arms. In this case, we have
returned to the realm of political opinions, because the conflict is no longer between the
principles themselves, but between the people who possess them as opinion. And while
differences between incommensurable political positions are, tautologically,
irreconcilable, differences between two people are not necessarily (Ankersmit 2002,
175).
Citizenship does not define the entirety of people within a political regime,
merely the political aspect. "[Wjriters sometimes sound as though everyone has opinions
ready on every possible question, and hence the only political problem is to get accurate
information about a national opinion that already exists" (Pitkin 82). Ankersmit notes that
"[ejvery ripple on the surface of society is now required to have its counterpart in the
decision-making process of the state. What follows is that most peculiar mixture of
absolutism and conservatism typical of the modern democratic state" (Ankersmit 1996,
54). On any political issue, there are two possibilities for any individual citizen: concern
and apathy. An individual either cares about a particular issue, or she or he does not.
Many factors work towards obscuring this simple dichotomy, in both theoretical and
descriptive approaches to politics, seeking to overly complicate political questions. A
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well-functioning regime will be sufficiently 'distant' from its citizens that those citizens
can 'observe' with which issues they are concerned and which they are apathetic.
Ultimately, a useful aesthetic approach to representative democracy is one that
takes seriously questions of how individuals find politics, not beautiful, as the term
aesthetic might imply, but meaningful or interesting. Interesting and its root interest are
terms with a variety of connotations, economic, political and personal. One must
remember, however useful, the concept oí homo economicus, that is, the entirely self-
interested individual, is nothing more than an abstraction, a convenient fiction for
exploring certain, but not all, questions of interest. The concept of interest implies more
than simple welfare, or what one has at stake. Interest also entails that which an
individual finds interesting, that is, an object of concern.
"We can see the [aesthetic] gap as embodying the void that is created by
indifference" (Ankersmit 1996, 103). The notion of indifference, in many ways
antinomous with the notion of interest, can only be useful in a political theory that
embraces the notion of individual perspective. For what would the interest or concern of
the individual matter unless so to did their perspective. Ultimately, a regime that believes
all citizens have informed opinions on every issue ofpolicy will be paralyzed.
"Indifference and stupidity are not necessarily the sand in the political machine but rather
the indispensable oil for making it function" (Ankersmit 1996, 102-3). How then can a
representative function in such an environment? This, 1 believe, is one of the first
questions an aesthetic approach to politics must be able to confront if it is to be of any
use.
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The Nature of Compromise
Political compromise is therefore essential to allowing for the representation of diverse
interests while still making political decisions. Political consensus will work only up until
the point where there is some fundamental disagreement about the purpose of politics:
"compromise is an organization of political truths rather than the justification of political
truth itself (Ankersmit 2002, 198).
A notion such as political compromise is perhaps best understood in terms of a
contrasting notion: political consensus. For Ankersmit, the most explicit, recent
elucidation of consensus is found in the work of Rawls. For Rawls, the ultimate goal of
political consensus is to provide a stable and just society, undivided by
"incommensurable religious, philosophical and moral doctrines" (Rawls, quoted in
Ankersmit 2002, 198-9). Consensus is to be achieved in practice by focusing on those
elements that can be agreed upon, that which unites and not divides. These elements will
tend to be found in action, not thought or moral conviction, because the latter is where the
divisions really exist (Ankersmit 2002, 199). "It is only because we do not personally
care about every problem confronting society and are indifferent to a large number of
issues that political compromise is possible at all" (Ankersmit 1996, 102-3).
Political representation only makes sense on the assumption of the
presence of a certain amount of political indifference and only political
indifference can create the distance from which the voter can get a grasp
of the political domain and of the (in)adequacy of how politicians propose
to deal with it (Ankersmit 1996, 103).
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Successful compromise requires a great deal of self-knowledge on the part of each
participant. For if one is not firm in one's convictions, one does not know on what one
can actually compromise.
"For, in contrast to compromise, consensus à la Rawls resists the bargaining of
political principles in the sense that I might be prepared to grant you your principle Pl
(though I remain firmly opposed to it) on the condition that you are willing to grant me
my principle Pl, because I prefer a political reality containing both principles to one
containing neither" (Ankersmit 2002, 203).
Political compromise requires an environment where representatives recognize
the limited and partial nature of the interests of their constituents. If every group were
equally concerned about/interested in every possible political issue, then political
compromise would be impossible. Political conflict and disagreement, the necessity of
which is understood by an aesthetic approach, which recognizes the brokenness of
political reality, need only happen on issues when separate groups truly have differing
interests. What citizens must ask themselves, and what representatives must demand of
their constituents, is whether or not it is worth taking a stand on an issue beyond their
particular parochial interest.
In a pragmatic political sense, certain interesting possibilities arise, if we add the
notion of political apathy to the simple dichotomy of agree or disagree. Ultimately, a
canny political representative might be able to exchange their support on issue A about
which their constituents are apathetic, for the support of another representative on issue
B, about which their constituents are apathetic. At the same time, either representative
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might want to oversell their constituents' opposition, when in fact they are only apathetic,
in order to exact greater political gains in the future. The particulars of such equations,
however, are beyond this theoretical discussion. Nonetheless, there is one element of the
representative democracy system already in effect that, while understudied in the realm
of political theory, has the opportunity, if developed, to incorporate the notion of
compromise into the political system.
Political Parties
There is one element of representative democracy in particular that helps secure its place
as the best regime for aesthetic representation, and that is because it is through political
parties that the paradox of representation can be resolved. The paradox, to reiterate, is the
simultaneous presence and non-presence of the represented object, in this case, the
constituency. The constituency is kept non-present through trusteeship representation,
granting the representative the freedom from having to mimetically recreate what the
constituency would otherwise do. Representative and represented are safely separated by
the aesthetic gap. The danger in a purely trusteeship relationship, however, is the lack of
guarantee that the interests of the constituency, is all its diversity, will be taken into
account. Political parties might be the medium through which the interests of the
constituency can be made clear to the representatives: medium being the crucial word, as
parties would have a 'mediating' effect. "The party is not the citizen but represents the
citizen" (Ankersmit 1996, 60).
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Clearly, political parties are entities that exist, in some capacity, between the state
and the citizens. Bearing in mind the necessary gap between state and citizen, the
question then becomes on which side of the gap are political parties. Are parties
organizations that citizens employ to relate to the state, or are they part of the apparatus
of the state, something by which the state can relate to the citizens? The closer the party
moves to citizens, the further from the apparatus of the state and vice versa (Ankersmit
1996, 57). Are political parties extensions of the citizens or of the state (Ankersmit 1996,
59)? The answer is to be found in the notion of representation. Parties do represent the
citizens, but they do not represent the state. Therefore, due to the necessary distance
between representative and represented, parties actually fall on the side of the state, not
citizens (Ankersmit 1996, 60).
This discussion presumes certain characteristics on behalf of the political party.
Ankersmit briefly identifies two types of political parties: governmental parties and
ideological parties. The latter, he says, operate with the tacit recognition that it is unlikely
that they will become part of the government, thus remaining closer to the citizens
(Ankersmit 1996, 57). Nonetheless, even the ideological party would fall on the state side
of the aesthetic gap, because they do not represent the government, but the citizens.
Effectively, the likelihood of a party gaining power has no bearing on its place in the
aesthetic structure.
Two problems which may be raised over describing political parties as organs of
the state, as opposed to being organic developments from civil society. The first arises
from the historical notion of faction, a pernicious entity that threatens the unity of the
56
sovereign, a "conspiracy against the nation or state" (Ankersmit 1 996, 60). The second is
the totalitarian legacy of 'state parties' from the Jacobins of revolutionary France to the
Nazi party and the various Communist parties that ruled throughout the Cold War
(Ankersmit 1996, 61). Examining these two sets of examples actually allows one to
observe, in an extreme version, the nature of political parties, and the necessity of coming
to terms with them. Clearly, factions unchecked are dangerous, especially when one gains
control over the entire apparatus of the state, as illustrated by the totalitarian examples.
The crucial realization is that a party is always partisan, and inherently does not
represent the point of view of all the citizens ofthat state. The existence of any party
implies, in logic, if not in fact, the existence of another party that represents the contrary
points of view. Ultimately, the state becomes strongest when a multiplicity of parties
exist, and therefore a multiplicity of points of view are represented, in tension with one
another (Ankersmit 1996, 62). This allows for the crucial element of all citizens having
the opportunity to feel represented.
In such an ideal situation, where at least two parties contend for power, the question
becomes how such a divided parliament will be able to accomplish anything. When there
is disagreement, and when a decision is made, someone is bound to be disappointed.
There are two possible ways conflicting parties are able to make a decision: compromise
and consensus. As we will see, consensus has much in common with discredited notions
of mimetic representation, and aesthetic representation requires the development of the
notion of compromise. In a sentence, consensus wipes out the difference of opinion
implied by a multiplicity of political parties. Compromise, on the other hand, allows for
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Political science is a promiscuous discipline, one not particularly discriminating in its
approaches to political questions. This may be due to the ubiquity of political
phenomena, or a lack of coherence as to what constitutes a 'political science' approach to
these questions. Just as the tools of economic theory can make intelligible questions of
public policy and rational choice, tools of aesthetic analysis can benefit appropriate
questions ofpolitical theory (Von Vacano 141).
At this point, it is worth reiterating what the notion of aesthetic representation can
offer the study of politics. The essential component of an aesthetic approach to politics is
the limitation of individual perspective, and the following necessity of representation.
Without representation there is no politics. And furthermore, the act of representation is
necessarily an act of interpretation. The representative must select, out of the infinite
possible interpretations of the mind of the people, the one course of action that best suits
the political situation of the time. Like the realistic painter, however, the representative is
also constrained by his or her own perspective (Nietzsche 65). The perspective of the
representative is just as limited as that of the represented, but the point of view is
different. As Machiavelli revealed, representative and represented can each see each
other, but neither can see themselves.
Representation requires a kind of interpretation that does not crystallize a certain
meaning for all times. Instead it relies on the constant attention of those involved.
Representation is thus beyond fact and value: there is no singular particular interpretation
59
of representation that either 'is' or 'should be'. This neutrality makes it a central point of
departure for political inquiry (Ankersmit 1996, 24). There is no scientific formula for
representation, no way of infallibly translating a thing into its representation that will
apply to all cases of representation. This becomes quite clear when one considers artistic
representation. It is safe to say that representation has often been a goal, or perhaps telos,
of the artistic process. It would be difficult to say, however, that a particular style of
artistic representation is better than any other, that cubism, say, is more representative
than impressionism, although one could say that in retrospect a particular style is more
representative of a particular era. Likewise, it is difficult to say whether Van Gogh or
Warhol created more universally representative work, although, either one might
reasonably be acclaimed as more representative of a particular era or of a particular style.
In each of these cases, some sort of representation was happening, but attempting to
create a formula to encompass any one of these examples will be unlikely to succeed. The
style of a particular artist or artistic era may be identifiable in terms of particular
characteristics, and indeed much scholarship on the part of critics and commentators
takes place addressing just such issues. The sheer variety of critically acclaimed artists
who have, to some degree, successfully represented reality can tell us something about
the nature of representation: it is potentially infinite, if we are to believe Nietzsche's
poem (Nietzsche 65).
Just as Ankersmit embraces the artistic connotations of the concept of political
representation, I have embraced the political connotations of the artistic subject. Subjects,
in the political sense, seem to have much in common with the subjects of art. In a
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democratic context, however, I believe it to be inappropriate to assume that the subjects
of a regime are passive to the degree that the subjects of art are. I would like to expand
this metaphor into the world of art, not just to the relation between a (political) artist and
his or her subject, but to the place of art in the world at large. While I cast political
representatives as artists and citizens as subjects of the work of art, I will not be leaving
the latter without any influence. I would like to add two other roles to the citizen: that of
art critic and patron. Ultimately, in a representative democracy, citizens have some
degree of power to both criticize and support (or not) the politicians that represent them. I
believe this threefold conception of citizenry presents interesting possibilities for
understanding the proper relationship between citizens and their government.
How could any form of government take these aesthetic ideas into account?
Ankersmit believes that representative democracy, properly considered, is the closest
type of regime to addressing these issues, and I agree. At the risk of imbuing this work
with an explicitly normative, although not monological, perspective, I believe it
appropriate to quote him here in full:
And we should therefore praise and honor representative democracy, since
it so obviously is the system of government that is most successful in
giving actual constitutional form to the requirements of representation.
And similarly we should be weary [sic] of all attempts to devise general
rules or some kind of general background that would enable us to move
quasi-automatically and unproblematically from the represented to its
representation in the sphere of politics or in that of art (Ankersmit 2002,
192).
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Aesthetics, then, offers the best chance for the citizens to have perspective on their
government. The notion of distance, the aesthetic gap, provides a space in which to
discuss these questions of representation.
Understanding, even celebrating the differences between ruler and ruled is
essential to clarifying their relationship (Ankersmit 1996, xiv). As Pitkin illustrates:
Most people see from a single point of view and have no perspective on
themselves, no awareness of perspective ... He must become the other yet
remain himself ... The theorist, understanding the plurality of human
perception and the complex relationship between appearance and reality in
political life, may be able to provide perspective, a synthetic overview of
the whole (Pitkin 1 984, 35-6).
Coda
The ultimate aim of my project has to determine both the centre and periphery of
aesthetic political theory. The centre is composed of those political objects and
phenomena for which an aesthetic approach is most appropriate, and the periphery of
those for which this framework is least, but still somewhat, appropriate. By
circumscribing this periphery, we can also come to an understanding of what are
inappropriate objects of study. Defining centre, periphery and beyond in a complete and
consistent manner will likely prove an impossible task. I cannot imagine exact criteria
whereby a certain type of political object is necessarily excluded from an aesthetic
approach for all time. By adopting this approach, however, I wish to cement the
recognition that aesthetics, like any theoretical approach, is a set of tools for political
analysis, ones that will be more or less appropriate depending on the situation. By
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attempting to uncover the scope and limits of this framework, I hope to guide future
research, to develop not a map that describes an area, but a compass that suggests
direction. I will do my best to ensure that the compass is as finely tuned as possible, but
only exploration will ultimately determine whether or not the instrument is of any use.
As a work of political theory, and not pure philosophy, the aesthetic framework
could be further explored in terms of application. I find it a shame that political theory
and empirical political science rarely intersect. Without excursing too far afield into
issues surrounding interdisciplinary study, if the aesthetic framework is to have merit as a
theoretical grounding for political study, then its conclusions should be bom out in the
results of empirical study. Much has been made in this work of the nature of political
representation, the representative and the represented. How do these theoretical exercises
relate to the actual practice of representative politics?
And ultimately, what is at stake for democracy? "In democracy independence will
always be a vulnerable 'product of art': it will always tend to destroy itself and to change
into either dependence or into a condition of isolated existence that is a sad character of
what independence initially was" (Ankersmit 1996, 318). An aesthetic approach to
politics thus helps revitalize two elements considered essential to democracy: citizenship
and legitimate authority, legitimate, in that it is grounded in aesthetic representation. "In
the political representation process, a depiction of a political will that exists in one
medium (the people) is made visible and present in another medium (the representative
body)" (Ankersmit 1996, 45). "Mimetic political power tends to become invisible, and
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therefore uncontrolled, power; aesthetic power, on the other hand, is clearly visible,
recognized as such" (Ankersmit 1996, 55).
There is an argument to be made, however, that the balance has tilted at present in
favour of the mimetic side, that representatives have become more delegates than
trustees. I hope to demonstrate why that is problematic, and, potentially, undemocratic. In
the Canadian context, for example, there is an argument to be made that pre-
Confederation parliamentary democracy exemplified much more an independence model
of representation than the contemporary situation, with its focus on leadership politics
(Moore xi-xii). Demonstrating this as conclusive fact would likely require a fair amount
of quantitative research. By revealing conceptual problems with the delegate model of
representation, however, I hope to have revealed that any time this understanding of
representation is in effect, one needs to question whether or not representation is actually
happening. The simple presence of this direction should provide a base for a discussion
of the rehabilitation of trusteeship representation. I argue that Ankersmit' s model of
aesthetic representation allows for such rehabilitation by revitalizing the strengths of
trusteeship while at the same time offering solutions to the critiques posed by proponents
of delegate representation.
I suspect that democratic representation is not the only problem for which an
aesthetic approach can prove useful in resolving. Rather than enumerating other
possibilities, however, I feel it best to simply suggest adding aesthetic political theory to
the toolbox of political science. Perhaps, now that it has been brought to light, other
theorists might find it useful.
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